Text from the collective work: Wolność i jej granice. Polskie dylematy, OMP, Kraków 2007.

In the country and the political system known as the Polish People’s Republic, the absence of freedoms was the fundamental aspect of human experience, argues Ryszard Legutko in his brief introduction to his latest book Traktat o wolności[1]. The vast majority of Poles whose adult lives were shaped within the quarter of the century prior to the fall of Communism or earlier, would undoubtedly agree. Subsequent acts of opposition against the system that occurred in Poznań, on the Coast and in Radom, and, eventually, the emergence of the Solidarity movement, demonstrated that the sense of captivity marked the lives of millions of people, and the awareness of the absence of freedom was not something experienced exclusively by generations of intellectuals. The way this sentiment was voiced was of great importance because it directed the drive and the thought towards the theme of freedom and the ways of realizing and reinforcing it. Consequently, not only did negative sentiments related to the daily experience of life within the system of the Polish People’s Republic lead to rebellion, but they also inspired profound reflection upon the nature of political reality of Communism and factors that shaped it, as well as the nature of freedom and institutional methods of realizing and guaranteeing it.

It seems that the thought of the opposition communities, meaning the select few of them founded in 1970s and 1980s that had a significant impact on the Polish opposition thought, features all of the principal concepts of freedom. However, the distinctive feature of the freedom thought in the Communist Poland is its association with collective and individual subjectivity, individual and national dignity, and justice, meant as equality before the law, the lack of privileges, and, at times, also economic equality. A frequently used argument in favour of the respect for individual and collective freedom was an inalienable nature of human rights. In some political agendas, it plays a parallel (Ruch), primary (KOR and KSS “KOR”) or secondary (ROPCIO) roles along with another prerequisite of individual and collective freedom, i.e. freedom of a community, a nation, from external coercion or exploitation, i.e. independence.

A.   Freedom as the absence of political, economic and ideological coercion:

·       Freedom from the control of USSRà independence;

·       Freedom from the totalitarian, single-party regime;

·       Freedom from economic exploitation by a foreign state;

·       Civic liberties (participation in the political life of a nation), freedom of speech (political discourse);

·       Intellectual freedom (freedom of scientific research, in particular within the social sciences and the Humanities), often referred to as freedom from ideology;

·       Religious freedom.

B.   Freedom as the possibility to pursue one’s goals:

a  Freedom/collective subjectivity as a prerequisite for individual freedom:

·       Freedom of nations;

·       Freedom as a realization of human rights (within the bounds of law) and a manifestation of human dignity;

·       Freedom as self-help – defence of and solidarity with the disadvantaged, development of realms not being subject to the regime control;

·       Freedom as the development of a parallel society, that is a civic society parallel to the state (informed by the idea of self-help and solidarity);

·       Freedom as non-political politics – the ‘power of powerless’, avoidance of political fight in favour of the focus on the concept and practice of social self-organization;

·       Freedom of association;

·       Freedom of speech and intellectual freedom: an independent publishing movement.

b. Freedom/individual subjectivity as a prerequisite for collective freedom:

·       Individual freedom based on the Christian concept of a human and human rights;

·       Individual freedom based on property, material self-reliance and responsibility, and economic independence from the state (Mirosław Dzielski, Stefan Kisielewski, and Warsaw and Gdańsk liberals in the 1980s).

Ruch 1965-1970

In his characterization of the objectives of Ruch in his book “Ruch” przeciw totalizmowi, Stefan Niesiołowski stressed the close relationship between the critique of Communism as a totalitarian system and the demand for Poland to regain independence. Although, as Niesiołowski argues, this contributed to Ruch’s being considered as a pro-independence organization rather than an anti-totalitarian one, its agenda documents stressed the significance of the fight with totalitarianism not only as a cause of Poland’s having lost its independence, but also as the source of pathology and threats in virtually all realms of life, both in private and public spheres. The recovery of independence, and thus of the national and state freedom, was considered by Ruch as a prerequisite for remedying the consequences of the totalitarian system[2]. In addition, members of this organization recognized critique of various aspects of the said system, its ideology, economy, propaganda, hypocrisy and corruption, as the fundamental goal of their activism. They were also aware that it would be very difficult to achieve those goals and that it would take, at least in the initial period, commitment of a small group of activists that would “inspire the society to take action [...], formulate a theoretical base and a detailed agenda, which – presented to the society at the right time – should play a significant role in the process of Poland’s regaining its independence.” The final result was to build a democratic system modelled after Western democracies with the consideration of Polish peculiarities. Ruch drew upon the tradition of WiN Association (Wolność i Niepodległość), above all when it comes to opposing Communism. However, the Agenda Statement Mijają lata…, penned by Andrzej and Łukasz Czuma in collaboration with Stefan Niesiołowski, Emil Morgiewicz, Benedykt Czuma and others, stressed that Ruch was not a follow-up to “any political movement in our recent history, especially in the interwar period of the Second Polish Republic.”[3] The authors of the Agenda Statement believed that, in the face of the ever-greater differences between totalitarianism and the free world, the conditions of life in the Communist system called for new methods of action and adoption of goals/demands representative of a myriad of political movements:

1.        "Independence as a fundamental factor in social and economic development of the nation;

2.        Respect for the human individual and their inalienable rights;

3.        Efficient economic growth;

4.       State’s commitment to programming essential outlines of the nation’s sustainable economic development;

5.        Effectiveness of social activity;

6.       Intellectual development;

7.        Social equality and equal opportunities for everybody;

8.       Eliminating unjustified privileges and related social exploitation;

9.       Freedom of press and assembly;

10.    Efficient, competent, responsible and stable legislature;

11.      Institutional protection of freedom to vote for representatives of the society;

12.     Well ordered social and political lives;

13.      Constructive participation in the life of nations;

14.     Eradication of doctrinaire economic and political myths.”[4]

Irrespective of the generalized nature of most of these demands, the major ones appear to be freedom, justice and equality.[5] Freedom is conceived both in collective terms (as independence of the nation and the Polish state), and in individual terms (as independence covering civil liberties that enable democracy to operate). Characteristically enough, the call to respect the human being and their inalienable rights within the Agenda Statement follows the demand for independence and precedes the items concerning equality, justice, freedom of press and assembly and free elections. The authors profoundly believed that the human being has certain inalienable rights, and, consequently, are entitled to freedom by nature. Invoking those rights allows exclusion of some system solutions that are incompatible with them and provides the base for their critique, irrespective of consequentionalist arguments (pointing to negative economic consequences and institutional and administrative defects of the system). In addition, such a reference enables adoption of other system forms that support human development. The concept of a human being is used as the basis for the concepts of equality and justice conceived as equality before the law and elimination of unfair privileges.

Much of the Agenda Statement is devoted to the critique of Soviet totalitarianism: its ideology based on lies; the control of each aspect of collective and individual lives; the use of physical terror, and the propaganda of fear of alleged internal and external enemies. In their characterization of the Polish situation, the authors stressed Poland’s colonial dependence on the USSR, something that made the former a dummy state with an apparent democratic system and alleged political pluralism in the form of licenced representation of select political and social communities (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, Stowarzyszenie PAX, and Koło Poselskie ZNAK), but with an economy that is centralized, inefficient and thoroughly corrupt, as well as exploited by Soviet Russia. The critique of totalitarianism and Communist Poland is based on the said concept of a human being and their rights and the category of a nation as a fundamental community and their rights, as well as the idea of the common good. As conceived by Ruch activists, freedom is a prerequisite for and, being an element inalienable from the human being, a source of the right to individual and collective self-development and organize social life in line with a value system recognized by individuals and the nation (“the right to the freedom of thought and action,” necessary for cultural development and independent creative thought).

The Agenda Statement also raises the issue of the need to transcend certain alternative at moral, social and political levels that appeared to be the only possible one: to either work and passively support totalitarianism and the Polish People’s Republic, or to collaborate with the totalitarian regime and reap benefits. The so-called ‘third solution’ is the freedom to act based on the universal system of values informed by the Polish experience. Another “devil’s alternative” is associated with Poland’s geopolitical position between Germany and Russia (at the time between FRG and GDR and USSR); to transcend it, i.e. to transcend the choice between the two neighbours with imperial ambitions, Poland has to be reinforced and turned into the ‘third power’ through close cooperation and integration with states and nations of the Central and Eastern Europe based on shared interests. With such integration, the relationships with both neighbouring countries could be based on a friendly foundation. The transcendence of both alternatives requires courage and action. Obviously, as activity geared towards values, ‘the third solution’ is a manifestation of freedom within captivity and the beginning of the expansion of freedom. Turning Poland into the ‘third power’ is the next step, which requires recovery of independence and the quest for solutions of political nature; hence, this goal facilitates initiation of the process to regain independence. This goal also remains an element of certain far-reaching political design to fundamentally restructure Poland so that it can become a free and modern state governed by people elected by the nation in free elections.

Consequently, the Agenda Statement outlines changes in foreign and domestic policies (relationships with neighbouring countries: Russia and Germany), provides a rough design of the elements of a political system (the principle of a government accountable to the Sejm, with the limitation of the influence of the parliamentary majority on government’s actions) and points to major trends within economic policy (international economic cooperation, free market with elements of state interference to level out economic differences between Polish regions) and science, education and culture policies (the principle of free research, creative and educational projects; provision of the institutional basis for political activity and for the development of its intellectual resources; freedom of political discourse, in particular of the critique of state bodies; independence of the judiciary, and, at last, guaranteed free operation of the Church and the separation of the Church from the state (a ban on pursuing simultaneously state and administrative roles by the clergy).

From the perspective of about 40 years later, the ideas of Ruch appear very mature, and the fact that the question of freedom was considered against social and political backdrops and with references to Christian anthropology rather than merely in abstract terms, results in freedom being framed in universal terms, complemented by the idea of an individual seen from the perspective of human rights, and also alludes to the local Polish tradition (the association between individual and national histories). What seems very interesting is the diagnosis of Poland’s situation under totalitarian captivity and the overview of goals that Poland should pursue after it would regain its independence so that it could become a modern state and society, well organized and resting on collective experience. The weakness of the political agenda of Ruch, which has all of the characteristics of a political party agenda, is the brevity of the way political institutions meant to provide the foundation for individual and collective freedoms are defined. A comparison with later Apel do społeczeństwa i władz PRL, founding Komitet Obrony Robotników, reveals a clear political nature of Ruch.

Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej KOR (Komitet Obrony Robotników), 1976

The protests, mainly by workers from Ursus, a town near Warsaw, and Radom, in a response to the authorities’ price increases of consumer products, especially of food, were followed by repressions (arrests, beatings of the arrestees – the so-called ‘fitness trails’, i.e. beating people urged to go through two rows of policemen with batons; dismissals from work; harassment of families of those arrested etc.)[6]. Although it caused widespread outrage, only a handful of people – with political views ranging from left- to right-wing (including Rev. Jan Zieja), chose to reach out to those suffering repression and their families. On 23 September 1976, Komitet Obrony Robotników (KOR) was established. A writer Jerzy Andrzejewski, an author of, among others, an ambiguous novel Popiół i diament, at the time committed to anti-Communist opposition, reported this fact to the Sejm with an open letter addressed to the then Marshal of the Sejm and coming with a call to the society and to the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic. Opting for transparency of their objectives and activities, the authors of the call sought to give them the semblance of legal actions, in line with the law of the Polish People’s Republic. They also invoked fundamental human rights respected by the international law and, at least formally, by the then Polish law. They invoked the right to work, strike, freely express worldviews and attend meetings and demonstrations. The authors argued that those rights were violated as physical violence and repression were used, and judicial proceedings and labour code regulations were not abided by: “The use of repressions usually consisted in the authorities breaking the law. The courts issued rulings without evidence; labour code rules were violated with some dismissals. In some cases, testimonies were forced by violence. The authors of the call stressed the exceptional brutality of the police, and, importantly, pointed to the trend to use repression, thus indirectly pointing to the terror as an essential factor of exercising power within a Communist system. The call demanded “amnesty for the convicts and arrestees and return of all victims of repression to work.” The authors of the document also vowed their solidarity with “the resolution of the Episcopal Conference of 9 September 1976.”

Undoubtedly, signatories’ primary motives were of moral nature. They knew that spontaneous financial support for the victims and their families was insufficient: it was necessary to raise funds on a much bigger scale to enable consistent support for those who needed it; legal support was also required by arrestees and everyone facing charges. The call stressed the refusal from official institutions tasked with providing aid, including material aid, and called for solidarity and mutual help. In addition, the society was clearly pictured in contrast to the political system, and those persecuted were treated as representatives of the former. “Victims of the current repressions cannot count on any help or defence from institutions appointed to provide it, e.g. trade unions, whose role is pitiable. Social welfare agencies also refuse to provide help. In this situation, it is the society, in the interest of which those persecuted have acted, that has to accept this role. Society has no methods to defend itself against lawlessness but solidarity and mutual help.

The invocation of the resolution of the Episcopal Conference on the persecution was of immense significance to the wider public, the intended addressees of KOR’s call, because it demonstrated that the signatories’ actions were not isolated instances and that the Catholic Church, an institution with great authority and an established position in Polish society, shows concern for the oppressed.[7] It is worth pointing out that Komitet Obrony Robotników came across as an initiative supporting the stance of the Church, and its call, being in line with the stance of the Episcopal Conference, could not be recognized as an action of some group acting on a purely political agenda.

Of course, under the Communist system, regardless of differences among various Communist states (in Poland, the regime was milder in some respects due to social resistance in the form of protests against poor living conditions in 1956, 1970, 1976 and in the ensuing years, and the stance of the Catholic Church, which had significant bearing on the attitudes of most Poles and had organizational structures independent of the state), all public actions that got out of authorities’ control and the official and police apparatus would immediately take on political significance as manifestations of freedom aspirations, i.e. independence from the system.

People were persecuted for exercising their fundamental right to freely voice their views and self-organize. Their courage to be free required support from others and, in this sense, individual and political freedom, or civic freedom, was based on the solidarity within the community. The experience of freedom as a community and national phenomenon, reinforced by the Polish Pope present in the lives of Poles, and by the activity of the Independent Self-governing Labour Union ‘Solidarity’ between 1980 and 1981 (and to a large extent also during the martial law and later on) – imparted a special character to the individual freedom since it did not cause social atomization; quite on the contrary, it was closely related to the community life on various levels of social organization.

Taking actions to provide various kinds of help to the victims of repressions was a form of self-organization that the authors of the call encouraged. From the perspective of voicing the objectives, as well as engaging as many people from various communities in regions other than Warsaw and its environs as possible to pursue those goals, the call for solidarity and mutual help was of great importance. By invoking the sense of justice and fundamental human feelings, the activists inspired self-help activism. The authors of the call were aware that the fear of repressions had to be broken in order to achieve independence. The cooperation for the benefit of the injured, repressed and convicted and their families was meant to encourage that. That was the way to rebuild social relationships, deliberately and consistently damaged by the Communist regime. Aid for the victims of repressions and their families was contingent on effectively delivered information about specific individuals and their needs, and this required collection, delivery and processing of information. To that end, not long after KOR had been founded, in the apartment of Jacek and Grażyna Kuroń, a centre committed to collecting and compiling information (reported over telephone or in person) and preparing relevant activities was set up. Although their phone was obviously tapped and the Security Service had access to all information received by the centre, both material and legal aid were effectively delivered. Soon, the centre was transformed into an office, a specialized organizational structure, later known as Intervention Bureau of KOR’s Social Self-Defence Committee, headed by Zofia and Zbigniew Romaszewski. Its mission was to collect information on violations of human rights in Poland and provide victims of repressions with support. A year after Komitet Obrony Robotników (Workers Defence Committee) had been first founded, its founders and new members transformed KOR into Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej KOR (Social Self-Defence Committee KOR) and adopted “the Democratic Movement Declaration,” which envisaged the following goals: helping victims of repressions; fighting with repressions for political, worldview, religious and racial reasons; opposing violations of the rule of law; seeking to institutionally secure civic rights and liberties; and supporting and defending social initiatives that aim to exercise human and civic rights[8]. KSS “KOR” continued its support activities, kept growing its information operations and came to issue an Information Newsletter. Mirosław Chojecki, a member of KOR, founded Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza “NOWa”, which disrupted the state publishing monopoly along with other small publishing houses. In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, when the martial law had been launched and Solidarity had been illegalized, the publishing activities by communities with various political orientations made, judging by the quantity and diversity, an impressive feature of the Polish opposition. With the sense that freedom of expression is the prerequisite for Polish transformations, publishing houses and (at times ephemeral) magazines were founded virtually everywhere, not only in major cities. Although many of them were monitored by the Security Service, and some, as shown by the archives of the Institute of National Remembrance, were controlled by the Security Service, they undoubtedly provided access to information and political and fiction literature to a great number of people.

The mentioned objectives and activities of KOR and KSS “KOR” were of political nature, although KOR members would often stress their non-political character. This was associated with the concept of an overt, civic action, parallel to and independent of the Communist state, as adopted at the outset of KOR’s existence. It resembled the idea of “non-political politics” laid out by Vaclav Havel in The Power of the Powerless (1978, Polish publication 1984).

The idea of the Self-governing Republic of Poland, promoted by Solidarity following the first National Convention of Delegates in October 1981, stemmed out of the idea of a civic society independent of the system of the Polish People’s Republic while at the same time transcending that system’s utopian character as it clearly defined an objective to pursue, that is an independent Polish state: “We recognize the people’s rule as a principle we cannot give up. The people’s rule cannot be a rule exercised by groups that put themselves above the society and claim the right to decide about and represent the interest of the entire society. The society should have the possibility to speak with a full voice, to express the full range of social and political views; it should have the possibility to organize itself in a way that provides for fair participation in material and spiritual goods of the nation and unleashing all of its capabilities and creative powers. We want to factually socialize the systems of governance and economy. For this reason, we aim at a self-governing Poland. We cherish the idea of freedom and full independence. We will support everything that reinforces national and state sovereignty, supports free development of the national culture and transition of history. We believe that our national identity shall be fully recognized[9].”

Later on, main KOR activists: Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnik and Bronisław Geremek pursued clearly political activities and sought to present methods of solving social and economic problems that could be accepted by the Communist regime (both Polish and Soviet) and would meet the essential aspects of the expectations within the Polish society. This is the original ideological source of the compromise with the Communist regime, which then led to the talks in Magdalenka and the Round Table Agreement. Regardless of our critical view of the Round Table, where some political visions were not represented at all, it is hard to identify any more advantageous scenarios to overthrow Communism in Poland that might have been possible. It is rather the lack of will to use the opposition’s win in the first Sejm election and the establishment of the government headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki to curb the influence of those associated with the Polish People’s Republic on state and economic institutions that might be seen as a consequence of the apparently non-political thinking and the absence of a clear vision for an independent Polish state in which the officials of the Communist state would be dealt with justly but not necessarily rewarded with political and economic power. In this sense, the attained national and political freedom failed to properly materialize.

Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela (ROPCiO, Movement for Defence of Human and Civic Rights), 25 March 1977

Several months after Komitet Obrony Robotników had been founded, a new social movement emerged that stressed the demand to defend human rights and thus human dignity, as well as collect information about violations of those rights. The organization issued a call to mobilize the society. The signatories: retired General Mieczysław Ludwik Boruta-Spiechowicz, Andrzej Czuma, Karol Głogowski, Kazimierz Janusz, Stefan Kaczorowski, Leszek Moczulski, Marek Myszkiewicz-Niesiołowski, Antoni Pajdak, Zbigniew Sekulski, Zbigniew Siemiński, Bogumił Studziński, Rev. Bohdan Papiernik, Rev. Ludwik Wiśniewski, Adam Wojciechowski, Andrzej Woźnicki, Rev. Jan Zieja and Wojciech Ziembiński, stated as follows: “We are not forming an organization or an association. Our initiative is dictated by an urgent social need. Poland has already seen a powerful social movement: RUCH OBRONY PRAW CZŁOWIEKA I OBYWATELA. We appeal to all people in Poland to provide us with moral support, to cooperate with and help us, especially in collecting information, necessary for our organization to pursue its mission, regarding violation of human and civic rights, and to undertake and develop similar initiatives across all social, professional and regional communities. Human and civic rights and individual dignity can be maintained only if everybody abides by them and if everybody demands, with their actions, that they should be respected.”[10]

ROPCiO was not strictly an association since activists affiliated with it represented a wide spectrum of political views. In addition, ROPCiO’s activists vowed readiness to work with other movements, including KOR. However, the community of KOR saw the rise of ROPCiO as an attempt to break KOR and the entire opposition in Poland. Accusations of collaboration with the Security Service cropped up, mainly with respect of Leszek Moczulski, who has since sought to reclaim his reputation following a judgment that established he had lied in his vetting process[11]. Regardless of whether Leszek Moczulski was a secret collaborator or not, he aptly defined ROPCiO’S objectives, which he then parted with to found a political party Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej in 1979: “It is not an idea typical of right-wing politics, nor of Piłsudski followers. We attach great importance primarily to a strong state. Both in Helsinki agreements and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first of these rights is the right to have an independent state. It was clear to us that we would want to primarily highlight this point. We chose the name Ruch Obrony (‘defence movement’) as it was a paraphrase of Ruch Oporu (‘resistance movement’).” ROPCiO’s political agenda was framed in a similar vein by Bartłomiej Kozłowski: “The point of departure for the political agenda of ROPCiO’s was the defence of human and civic rights in Poland, but this theme was mainly an excuse to put forth the essential demands related to Poland’s political system and politics. ROPCiO’s major objectives were to change Poland’s political system and provide for Poland’s radical independence of the Soviet Union. While for KOR, which aimed primarily to extend the sphere of individual civic liberties, the issue of regaining full independence was beyond horizon, ROPCiO decisively opposed the popular idea of the so-called ‘Finlandization’, even for an interim period. ROPCiO also heavily stressed anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism[12].”

A historian of a younger generation Antoni Dudek wrote about ROPCiO in a similar fashion: “Despite the name and formally vowed objectives, initially consisting in monitoring Polish authorities’ compliance with the International Covenants on Human Rights ratified in early March 1977, the aspirations of Ruch leaders were much more ambitious. ROPCiO was conceived as a kind of an opposition incubator that aimed to form people and organizations that would then come to overtly fight for Polish independence. This, indeed, happened so, but the history of Ruch, abounding in conflicts and schisms, is a kind of prefiguration of the history of the right-wing political scene after 1989”[13]

While using a language of human and civic rights, in its operations, ROPCiO would actually put emphasis on freedom and collective subjectivity as a prerequisite for other kinds of freedom; to put it otherwise, similarly as Ruch, ROPCiO thought of freedom as independence of the Polish nation and state. This aspect of freedom was far from prominent in KOR’s statements. This was so not because KOR members did not want Poland to become an independent state, but because they saw independence as a goal that was far-reaching and not quite realistic, and some of them were anxious to stir nationalistic sentiments and expectations as these, in their view, could take the form of the idea of a state based on aggressive nationalism, associated with religious fanaticism, removed from the vision of a tolerant state and society based on human and civic rights.

In addition to conflicts between various opposition groups, these groups suffered from infighting, which led to divisions and, oftentimes, fragmentation and emergence of new opposition organizations. This was the fate of ROPCiO’s, too. Leszek Moczulski left Ruch and, in early September 1979, founded an opposition party Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, the first party of this kind to have ever been established in a Communist state. Moczulski single-mindedly committed to political activism in an organized fashion as he reckoned a movement formula would be too loose and therefore not quite effective. KPN was fraught with conflicts and divisions, but it was wholeheartedly committed to the cause of Poland’s independence. In some regions of Poland, Konfederacja gained considerable support in workers’ communities, especially at the time of the legal operation of the Independent Self-governing Labour Union “Solidarity” as the latter provided a kind of protective umbrella to various organizations that had not gained a legal status. This, however, did not save Moczulski from spending several years in prison. In the late 1970s, many people associated with opposition communities came to view the slogan of Poland’s independence as not quite realistic. Leszek Moczulski’s argument that independence is there to take and just needs an action seemed to the author of these words mere romantic musings; although, on the other hand, KPN reasonably relied on Piłsudski tradition, in which the principle “where there's a will, there's a way,” i.e. “you have to want independence for it to ever happen,” undoubtedly supported by the Polish romantic tradition, along with the ability to calculate and make decisions, played a significant role[14].

It seems that, during the Polish opposition against the Communist system, the Polish romantic tradition, not always evident, played an important role as a source of opposition to oppression and of the drive towards independence in its various forms, especially state and national independence, inextricably linked to freedom of an individual as a human being.

At last, it is worth mentioning Mirosław Dzielski and a community that remained open to the ideas of individual freedom, which it associated primarily with free business and private property subject to market transactions. Dzielski was primarily a thinker, and although he was involved in the public life through his participation in debates within opposition communities, usually under the umbrella of the Catholic Church, he was not a typical opposition activist as he did not form any movement nor did he found an opposition party. Only in the late 1980s, together with his friends, would he seek to register Krakowskie Towarzystwo Przemysłowe (KTP), the fruit of meetings between business people (at the time owners of craft businesses, small trading, manufacturing and service companies, struggling with supply issues and harassed by financial departments, thus seasoned in the struggle with the system) and intellectuals drawn to free-market ideas, who worked at state, bureaucratic universities, research institutes and design firms. KTP found followers in Warsaw, Gdańsk and other cities of Poland. According to Dzielski, open anti-regime activism was doomed to failure as authorities would respond to opposition activities, especially the drive towards democracy, with a fear of dismantling the foundations of a system that provided people closely associated with the regime, as well as some members of the Polish United Workers' Party and the so-called ‘factions’ (SD and ZSL), with guaranteed privileges, mainly related to consumption. Drawing upon classics of the liberal political and economic thought, in his numerous columns, papers and articles, Dzielski promoted the vision of a society of individuals capable of living independent and responsible lives and peacefully working together[15]. Such a lifestyle, in his view, would be based on the possibility to make business, that is economic freedom.

The most essential objective of Dzielski’s agenda was to present economic freedom as something that would also be beneficial to the authorities. Dzielski suggested that opposition should not consist in fighting against system people, but in finding a plane of friendly coexistence, or even economic cooperation. Economic freedom and related development were meant to benefit every individual and the society at large. The emphasis on local matters was meant to encourage everyone to work together regardless of their political views and positions within the power system. During police hearings, Dzielski presented his point of view to the officers of the Security Service (famed Captain Knapik, committed to infiltrating the lives of Jagiellonian University staff members), with the hope that the ideas he laid out will, via hearings reports, reach decision makers. While promoting the concept of economic freedom, Dzielski did not resign from political activism; however, he thought of it in terms of providing conditions for activity free from ideological imperatives rather than struggle. That stemmed from a belief that the regime has to be dismantled by reducing its level of anxiety and prompting it to take actions geared towards individual profits and private property, which would bring positive results on a larger social scale, as argued for a long time by Adam Smiths and other economic liberals. Consequently, individual freedom was meant to bring benefits to everybody, and, in the long term, contribute to disintegrating the regime and releasing Poland from ideological and political thraldom.

If the previously discussed concepts of freedom came with an air of romanticism, then the ideas of Dzielski and the likes of him in Warsaw and then Gdańsk were closer to the positivist tradition. It does not seem, however, that Poland might owe its freedom in various realms of life and in various forms to one of those two broad ideological formations that occurred in the life of the anti-Communist opposition. Although, indeed, their interplay, even if rarely planned, played and continues to play a crucial role when it comes to the status of Polish freedom.