The collapse of the anti-Russian January Uprising in 1864 had serious consequences not only for Poland’s political situation, in particular, in its part under the Russian rule, but also for the way in which the national cause was perceived. The insurrection slogans radically lost their appeal, and the demand for the so-called organic work started to prevail. In the individual parts of the partitioned Poland active forces promoted the programme for reconstruction of the social structure, as well as cultural and social development, and everything at the price of the compromise with the authorities of the three partitions. At that time, the idea of triloyalism appeared, which, apart from rejection or suspension of the independence demand, assumed that Poles in all three partitions should pursue their policy independently. The Polish cause was replaced by regional issues of Poles in the individual partitions. In Galicia, which was ruled by the Habsburg dynasty, broad political autonomy started to be built, in the Kingdom of Poland journalists and writers from positivist circles tried to shake society out of the post-uprising apathy. However, the change of the perspective into the “local” one had its consequences in the form of marginalisation of the reflection on Poland in the international context; triloyalism ruled out, as a matter of principle, independence in this area. Loyalty towards the monarchs and states which partitioned Poland involved mainly subordination regarding international affairs. That process of the reformatting of the “Polish cause’s” programme was not only connected with the fall of the uprising, but also with the failed hope for Napoleon III’s help during the insurrection, as well as the depreciation of emigration centres, which started with the collapse of the Kraków Uprising in 1846. Even Julian Klaczko gave up studying diplomatic issues after France’s defeat by the increasingly strong Prussia in 1871. What, somehow, became the main area of international reflection was history. Lengthy discussions conducted by scholars gathered in Kraków or Warsaw historical schools about previous actions of the non-existent state were a certain substitute which was, however, very meaningful.
The rebirth of political thinking in international terms was tantamount to the departure from the triloyal perspective and creating the all-nation programme again, which, however, was not necessarily associated with the idea of independence, but with perceiving the nation, even without its political arm, as an entity participating in the international game. In the 1890s, a move away from the triloyalism programme began. Political groups invoking modern categories, which were able to attract masses, become more active. Polish socialism and nationalism – from different positions – raised the national cause again. However, while independence-minded socialists mixed anti-Russian programme with the class struggle perspective, one of the founding fathers, not only of the Polish, but also European nationalism – Roman Dmowski – raised the Polish cause in the international context again, and, de facto, determined the direction in which the main discussions of the political practitioners and theoreticians went before World War II, and, when it came to an end, the so-called Dmowski’s paradigm was still present in geopolitical discussions for a long time.
The point which enabled Dmowski to formulate the international programme was nationalist assumptions, i.e. that it is not states but nations which are the main participants of the competition. According to him, the fact that a nation could not fully express itself politically in the form of its own state did not exempt it from thinking in geopolitical terms. Irrespective of the political situation and the shape of the individual neighbouring states, the main conditions which determined the national policy changed much less than it might result from strategic political calculations. What was crucial was the category of the national character developed by Zygmunt Miłkowski, as well as other manifestations which were important for the survival and development of features of the tribal life. Dmowski in one of his most important works of 1908 entitled Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska clearly formulated its programme. He abandoned the anti-Russian direction, disregarded what was crucial to the earlier generations, i.e. the fact that the Russian Empire controlled vast majority of the land which made up the former Republic of Poland; he, however, paid attention to Russians’ assimilation ability, and was sceptical here. In the above-mentioned treaty he wrote: The Russian rule has already demonstrated what it is able to do using the biggest oppression and the most far-reaching means of Russification. However, those means were not able, even to the slightest extent, to reduce Poles’ national identity and independence, and failed to incorporate even part of the Polish element into the Russian organism. However, he looked differently at Germany, which, in his opinion, had extremely effective instruments which were a direct threat to the nation’s existence. Germany’s aim – he wrote – is to deprive us of those cultural and economic means which are necessary to keep the national independence and to live at our own, high cultural level; as well as to ploretarianise the Polish nation (….). On the basis of the above-mentioned assumptions, Dmowski came to an obvious conclusion: The awareness of the German threat has become established today throughout Poland, and the whole Polish nation considers today Germany as its main enemy, understanding that everything which is done anywhere in order to strengthen and defend the Polishness is, ultimately, the struggle with Germany.
The importance of Dmowski's speech in 1908 went much further than its impact on the geopolitical imagination of the Polish nationalism. Certainly, what was fundamental for generations of Polish nationalists was the significance of the ethnic factor, as well as the unambiguous and dogmatic definition of the role of the friend and enemy of the Polish cause. However, showing the Polish question in the context of relations between Russia and Germany was the key premise for the shape of Polish geopolitical discussions. What is more, Dmowski moved away from the traditional political “calculation” for France, and when the international situation connected with the Balkan crisis exacerbated, he clearly emphasised the importance of the antagonism between the two countries as an important indicator of the good climate for the Polish cause.
Dmowski – Piłsudski – Studnicki
In practice, Dmowski’s new approach quickly faced competition in the form of the programme implemented by Józef Piłsudski – at that time a member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). In the year in which Dmowski published Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska, Piłsudski, together with former fighters from PPS, started a political game based on the Central Powers, resulting in creation of paramilitary groups under the patronage of Austria-Hungary. Despite its socialist genealogy Piłsudski was a political traditionalist. Far from using any nationalistic terms and in line with the logic of the Polish irredentism, he clearly described Russia as Poland’s main political enemy. However, as Piłsudski, similarly to Dmowski, did not like the “less dangerous partitioning state”, the selection of the ally was the question of strategic choice. What became legendary was Piłsudski’s predictions about the forthcoming war. The future marshal of Poland said: The victory will come from the West to the East. What does it mean? It means that Russia will be defeated by Austria and Germany, and they, in turn, will be defeated by the British and French forces. Eastern Europe will suffer a defeat from Central Europe, whereas Central Europe from Western one. This tactics was consistently implemented by Piłsudski during World War I. In August 1914, he created, at the side of the Central Powers, legionary units which shoulder to shoulder with German and Austro-Hungarian troops fought Russians. What was the direct consequence of that effort was the establishment in the territory of the Russian partition, under the Act of 5th November, of the Kingdom of Poland, which was connected with the Central Powers. Then, in the summer of 1917, i.e. after the February Revolution in Russia and USA’s entering the war, it led to the so-called oath crisis, as a result of which most of the military units were dissolved, and Piłsudski himself was interned by Germans. Consequently, when the war came to an end, he was not in the same line as those who lost. However, Dmowski, who consistently organised political forces against Germany, was among the winners. Initially, he created in Warsaw the pro-Russian Polish National Committee, and once Russians were pushed off from the Polish territory, he did not agree for its operation in Paris with the French.
During World War I, one more way of looking at the issue of Poland’s relations with the big neighbours was formulated. That direction - with a big intellectual, but insignificant potential - was proposed by Władysław Studnicki during the rule of Governor-general Hans Beseler. When asked about the relations with Germany and Russia, Studnicki was consistently in favour of a relationship with Germany, as, similarly to Piłsudski, he perceived the tsarism as the main enemy of the Polish cause, and, similarly to Dmowski, he was thoroughly dogmatic in his attitude. Taking advantage of economic arguments, Studnicki did not advocate a temporary alliance, but a long-term geopolitical relationship as well as creating a Polish-German centre of political power in the heart of the continent. Despite the fact that Studnicki was a political and intellectual outsider, he formulated and promoted the idea of reaching agreement with the German state, which in the 1920s and 1930s was continued by a few important conservatives.
Once the Republic of Poland was reborn in autumn 1918, the most important perspectives of looking at the problem of relations with Russia and Germany had already been largely shaped. The period of the Second Republic was mainly dominated by the rivalry of the individual visions in practice and their corrections resulting from the changing course of events. Doctrines faced the resistance of facts and vice versa. Between the purely doctrinaire approaches advocated by Dmowski and Studnicki, there were actions of one of the most effective political practitioners – Piłsudski.
The beginning of the Second Republic and, first of all, the process in which the borders of the new country took shape, was the period during which former assumptions were adapted to the new circumstances, and, importantly, an attempt was made to implement them in the reality.
For a nation which achieved the crucial manifestation of its existence in the form of an independent state, the geopolitical perspective essentially changed. Not only had the requirement for finding a strong “patron” for the national cause disappeared, but also the post-war chaos and internal crisis significantly diminished the strength of the partitioning powers. Revolutionised Russia and defeated Germany, which coped with the revolution, were not initially able to play any role in international affairs. Thanks to the fact that the geopolitical requirements in the region had eased, it was possible to look at the Polish raison d'etat not only from the perspective of the closest surroundings, but also analyse the issue at the continental scale. The former assumptions did not become less important, and become the basis for formulating the former programmes, whose scope was, however, wider.
The national camp led by Dmowski clearly maintained its anti-German attitude, but what was the foothold for it was not Russia or, importantly, the Russian-French coalition, but, in line with the traditional patterns, mainly France. According to Dmowski, for Paris Poland replaced Russia as the main anti-German partner in the east, which was not groundless. After the collapse of the programme of disseminating communism in Europe in 1920, Dmowski decisively believed that the fact that Russia had fallen outside the geopolitical continent was an event which might have been of a lasting nature. The fact that Russia ceased to be important for the Polish cause from the political point of view was believed by Dmowski to have been caused mainly by serious problems of the Soviet state and, more importantly, by Russia’s strong involvement in consolidating its influence in the Asian part, as a result of which it paid less attention to European affairs. In the 1930s, before Hitler came to power, Dmowski openly wrote about the absence of threat from the Russia, and, which is important, from the possible Russian-German alliance. Today’s Russia – Dmowski wrote – still has a lot of territories which it needs to defend, for example the oil-rich Transcaucasian region or Central Asian cotton region, which is, in addition, the road to India, as well as territories which it needs to conquer, such as Northern Manchuria, which cuts it off from the Pacific. They are a hundred times more important to it than everything it could gain from Poland. It needs to be added that the land which could be taken from Poland would, giving Soviets relatively small benefits, cause internal problems to them, and they, after all, have too many of such problems. Some believe that Soviet Russia wants to change the Polish neighbour in the west for the German one, enlarged with a significant part of the Polish territory. We don’t.. Such a position – believed by Krzysztof Kawalec, who is an expert on Dmowski, to be too optimistic - lied at the root of the so-called great Polish illusion - a term coined by Adolf Bocheński which means the conviction about the stability of Eastern Poland and the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the Bolshevik state.
However, the main line of dispute at the beginning of the Second Republic did not concern whether Poland should be supported by France against Germany, but mainly concerned the issue of the eastern border. What was crucial to Dmowski was the ethnic question – in his opinion, it was the national cohesion that determined the strength of the individual political entities. For this reason, the so-called Dmowski’s line presented at the Versailles Conference indicated that Poland should own all territories in which the Polish factor constituted the predominant majority, and, consequently, any processes of assimilating national minorities stood a chance of success. Too many foreign nationalities as part of the state would only weaken its political effectiveness.
Contrary to Dmowski, Piłsudski noticed in the post-war flexibility of the international system a chance for a definitive solution of the problem resulting from Poland’s location between Russia and Germany, and, what is more, he already used the imperial scale. Between 1919 and 1920, Piłsudski, in the capacity of the Chief of State, made an attempt at implementing a federalist programme. In the spring of 1919, Polish troops entered Vilnius, and a year later, after the agreement with Ukrainian Ataman Symon Petliura, entered Kiev. Piłsudski, together with his collaborators, intended not only to create between Russia and Poland a kind of “buffer zone” in the form of such federated countries, as Ukraine or Lithuania, but by pushing the Russian influence off the Black Sea in the south and the Baltic in the north, he intended to restore the geopolitical situation of Poland from before the time of Peter I’s rule, i.e. the situation when Russia would permanently fall off the European network of geopolitical dependence. Piłsudski understood very well the sentence said by British geopolitician Halford Mackinder, who during his stay in Warsaw in December 1919, said: ‘Who rules the East Europe, commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland, commands the World-Island, who rules the World-Island, controls the World. What become slightly problematic was the issue of the possible border between Poland and the countries of the future federation. Undoubtedly, Piłsudski’s camp – which faced fierce criticism of national circles – assumed the possibility of certain territorial concessions to certain entities for the sake of maintaining the future federal structure.
Finally, the Polish-Bolshevik war ended in the compromise Peace of Riga signed in March 1921. It was a definite end of the stage during which the borders of the reborn Polish state shaped, as well as the practical end of any federation plans. To the nationalists, the military defeat of Piłsudski’s plan was a sufficient proof that their theory was right. However, irrespective of the line of reasoning, the year 1921 ends the active policy on the eastern border. Until the beginning of the 1920s, the Polish foreign policy and, to a large extent, political thought used the geopolitical isolation of the Soviet Union and were focused on strictly European affairs. The exclusion of the Soviet Russia from the Versailles order, which also made a harmless neighbour out of Weimar Republic, led to the situation in which the defence of the dominant international order based on the former western members of the Triple Entente and the League of Nations system was the crucial point of the Polish raison d'etat. In this order which did not include Russia, Poland became France’s key anti-German partner, which was somehow exploited (e.g. Locarno Treaties), but, at the same time, played an important role. During that peculiar international détente, the perception of the situation through the perspective of Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union, which had cooperated since the Treaty of Rapallo, significantly weakened. Few groups focused on the perspective imposed by the neighbouring countries. After Locarno Treaties, the Vilnius-based, conservative Słowo, a daily edited by Stanisław Mackiewicz, adopted Władysław Studnicki’s pro-German programme. While earlier Słowo consistently followed the pro-French orientation, after Locarno Treaties it decided that the existing solutions were insufficient, and Mackiewicz proposed a coalition of three main powers of the continent, i.e. France, Germany and Poland (the so-called Bjorko system). According to Słowo’s editor-in-chief, such a solution would allow playing an active role, in particular, against the Soviet Union. Consequently, while Locarno Treaties eased the German-French antagonism, Mackiewicz called for the next, this time “Polish Locarno” as a key to achieve the continental alliance. However, Mackiewicz had to wait a few years for the normalisation of the relations with Germany.
Beck and Germanophiles
The 1930s in the international politics were the new quality which indicated decomposition of the Versailles hope connected with the League of Nations and peaceful cooperation of nations. Hitler's ascent to power in 1933, followed by the Soviet Union’s increased diplomatic activity in the international area (admission of the USRR to the League of Nations in 1934 was symbolic) made the problem of Poland’s relations with the powerful neighbours a vital category again.
Supporters of Piłsudski, who came to power in 1926, pragmatically abandoned the former federation programme, leaving it, as a Promethean idea, on the outskirts of the official politics. Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński, which was published since 1931 by Włodzimierz Bączkowski, consistently – in line with the tradition of the Kiev campaign of the spring 1920 – promoted an active eastern policy, consisting in the support for separatism of various ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, and, in particular, one of the most numerous of them, i.e. Ukrainians. However, the official policy of Józef Beck, who since 1932 held the position of the minister of foreign affairs, went in a completely different direction.
At the beginning of the 1930s, Marshal Piłsudski clearly defined the objectives of the Polish foreign policy: the most important thing is the direct relations with the neighbours, and, secondly, such relations are secured by alliances. At the level of practical implementation, the principles of the Marshal consisted in entering into non-aggression pacts with the nearest surroundings, which was achieved in 1932 and then 1934, by signing relevant documents with the Soviet Union and Third Reich, and then protection on the basis of two allies: France and Romania, with which alliance treaties were signed at the beginning of the 1929s. The tactics was the response to the favourable environment for the Polish cause, which mainly consisted in a significant antagonism or even hostility between the Soviet Union and Germany. The so-called doctrine of balance, which was about keeping more or less the same distance to both of the neighbouring totalitarian states, became the indicator of the actions taken by the Polish diplomacy until the outbreak of World War II; on the assumption that the Soviet-German agreement was impossible, relying on France and, in a longer term, on the Great Britain genuinely allowed maintaining the existing subjective position in the international order. However, as regards the practical implementation, the doctrine of balance involved pursuing a defensive and passive policy, focused on keeping the fragile status quo. It was supposed to be a policy of strict neutrality between Germany and Russia. Although Beck looked for a chance to escape from that disastrous German-Russian embrace, and was in favour of the concept of the so-called Intermarium, i.e. the association of the countries of the region between the Baltic and Adriatic, which would effectively oppose the imperial plans of the Soviet Union and German Reich. However, due to the exclusion of Czechoslovakia from that plan, Romanian-Hungarian antagonism, passivity in the face of Germany’s activity in the region, as well as Poland’s non-competitive potential to attract in comparison with its neighbours, in practice the concept of Intermarium was an idea which fell through before it entered the phase of advanced implementation.
Apart from the traditional orientation on France picked up in the late 1930s by the milieu of Front Morges opposing the Sanation government, which, in analytical terms, did not introduced a lot of new things to the way in which the position of the Republic of Poland in the1930s, after entering into the non-aggression pact with the Third Reich, was perceived, a different perspective became prominent.
The movement initiated by above-mentioned Władysław Studnicki, more and more actively supported by Stanisław Mackiewicz since the mid-1920s, was significantly strengthened in the 1930s – which corresponded to its importance – by the milieu gathered around Bunt Młodych (since 1937 - Polityka), edited by Jerzy Giedroyć. The person who created the group’s geopolitical programme was Adolf Bocheński, who in the work Sprawa ukraińska jako zagadnienie międzynarodowe published in 1934, numerous commentaries and articles in the columns of Bunt, and, first of all, in the book entitled Między Niemcami a Rosją conducted an analysis of the revolution in the geopolitical orientation of Poles’ imagination which was about to take place.
Bocheński’s line of reasoning was simple: one should take advantage of the strong antagonism between Russia and Germany in order to destroy one neighbour by means of the other. The return of the Russia-German cooperation would be, de facto, the end of the Polish state. Due to the fact that Germany was an ethnic monolith, one could only expect permanent decomposition in the case of the communist Russia, where numerous ethnic antagonisms were hidden under the cover of the Bolshevik ideology. One of the main points of dismantling of the legacy of the House of Romanov was the creation of an independent Ukrainian state on the Dniester. Bocheński never clearly defined the scope of the potential cooperation with Germany - sometimes wrote about the possible right to march through Poland, and sometimes suggested a possibility of closer cooperation. In his case, the cooperation with Germany ruled by Adolf Hitler had a remarkably tactical dimension, as its point was to free Poland as well as the region of Central and Eastern Europe from the burdensome double domination. The destruction of the Soviet state, being, de facto, the completion of Piłsudski’s plan from 1919, would have broadened the political possibilities: it would have given a chance for the Central European block, as well as strengthened our position towards the allied France. It needs to be pointed out that the treaty signed with France in 1921 was a fundamental point for the assumptions made by Beck, Bocheński and Front Morges, and differences appeared only when questions about the scope of that alliance as well as extent of Poland’s independence in that arrangement were asked. Bocheński advocated abandoning the existing model of the relations with France, which was unfavourable to Poland. He believed that the possible cooperation with Germany to weaken Russia would strengthen Poland’s position in comparison with the allied France. He openly stated: let's not delude ourselves. The road to Paris does not lead Poland through drawing rooms, nor through trips to railway stations. This path is longer, but bigger, more splendid. Through Kiev, through Kharkiv and Odessa. In his vision, Germany played a role of a tool; he wrote: And the German Reich is today the battering ram [changing the order in this part of the continent – M. Z.’s note] which may conduct these salutary changes. Poland will, undoubtedly, be in conflict with this country in the future. The clash will probably happen as early as at the moment of the possible regulations of relations in the Eastern or Central Europe. In principle, however, allowing Germany and Italy to make an effort aimed at destroying the existing configuration of Eastern Europe is consistent with Polish raison d'etat. What needs to be strongly pointed out at this moment is the difference between Bocheński’s pro-German orientation and Studnicki’s proposal. The latter, respected by the author of Między Niemcami a Rosją himself and by the milieu of Bunt Młodych, assumed, however, establishment of a lasting order based on the interest of both nations. Bocheński did not delude himself that the conflict of interests exists, and one day it would lead to a conflict, but his objective was to take actions thanks to which the conflict would take place at more favourable conditions.
The difference from Dmowski’s position did not only concern the change of the orientation’s direction, but, first of all, was also the departure from dogmatic determination of who is a friend and who is an enemy – Bocheński emphasised flexibility in this respect. The decision to get closer to Germany was determined by actual circumstances, and Bocheński did not rule out the need for the re-orientation. However, that had already been made by his brother Alexander, who in 1947 published the work entitled Dzieje głupoty w Polsce, which was a realistic manifesto of cooperation with Russia. Adolf Bocheński himself was killed fighting Germans during the Battle of Ancona in July 1944.
The termination by Adolf Hitler of the non-aggression pact with Poland in the spring of 1939 put an end to the possibility of the implementation of the plans put forward by Bocheński and his supporters. Consequently, Bocheński limited his publishing activity, and other authors watched the developments with concern. Although a change and the first symptoms of a thaw in the Soviet-German relations were noticed in the summer of 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was interpreted rather as giving Hitler the free hand in the Polish cause than declaration of an intention to conduct a partition. At that time, that mistake was made not only by the majority of society and publishers, but also by decision-makers.
In the summer of 1939. Władysław Studnicki published a book under the prophetic title: Wobec nadchodzącej II wojny światowej. [In the Face of Imminent World War II]. The whole edition was confiscated. What was the work’s main thesis was the assumption that Stalin’s state will be the ultimate winner of the Polish-German conflict. He wrote: the only winner in the war between Western Europe and Central Europe is Russia. Barely two months later, the infamous pact together with a secret protocol were signed in Moscow. The worst geopolitical scenario materialised not only due to the alliance of the two powers, but also as a result of effective belittlement of Poland’s importance in the eyes of the western allies. During the dawn of the Second Republic, the situation was decided at the front, as was the case in 1920. Importantly, however, the Polish foreign policy returned, to a significant extent, again to the traditional 19th-century pattern. The key strategic points lied in the west, and they were no longer connected with France crashed by Hitler, but with Anglo-Saxon countries. Voices which called for a shift in focus, e.g. the controversial speech by Pruszczyński, which advocated adopting a pro-Russian course, were isolated, except for the Polish communists who were totally subordinated to Moscow, and were strongly criticised by Poles in exile. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its consequences closed a certain crucial phase of reflection on Poland’s problematic relations with the powerful neighbours – what was typical of that phase was a political strategy autonomous from Western Europe. The narrowing down of the geopolitical horizon made by Dmowski clipped the wings of the traditional geopolitics, and forced Poles to use resources which appealed less to imagination, but were more realistic. However, irrespective of the original position, e.g. the absence or presence of an independent state, what was crucial for that way of thinking was the belief that it was impossible to be in conflict with Russia and Germany at the same time. Even Minister Beck assumed the total absence of threat from the east when he adopted the doctrine of balance. Poland was neither prepared militarily not conceptually for the scenario which materialised in Europe in the summer of 1939. Probably, at that time there was no country which was prepared for that course of events. The next years clearly demonstrated helplessness of the whole Europe in the face of the dynamically changing history.
 R. Dmowski, Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska, Wrocław 2013, p. 141; more on Dmowski’s pro-Russian orientation can be found in, e.g. K. Kawalec, Problem prorosyjskości Romana Dmowskiego, [in:] Między realizmem a apostazją narodową. Koncepcje prorosyjskie w polskiej myśli politycznej, ed. M. Zakrzewski, Kraków 2015, p. 303 and the subsequent ones
 R. Dmowski, Niemcy, Rosja …., pp. 141-143.
 ibid., p. 142
 That role played by Dmowski was appreciated by Adolf Bocheński in his treaty Między Niemcami a Rosją, and he wrote, among other things: First of all, however, we need to mention the most important living Polish political writer, i.e. Roman Dmowski. Despite a certain contradiction with his views, we are pleased to notice that the guidelines on which this discussion is based were also the basis of his activity during the war period and immediately before its outbreak (Między Niemcami a Rosją, Kraków – Warsaw 2009, pp. 37-38).
 As cited in: T. Serwatka, Józef Piłsudski a Niemcy, Wrocław 1997, p. 31.
 See more in J. Sadkiewicz, „Ci, którzy przekonać nie umieją”. Idea porozumienia polsko-niemieckiego w publicystyce Władysława Studnickiego i wileńskiego „Słowa” (do 1939), Kraków 2012.
 R. Dmowski, Świat powojenny i Polska, Wrocław 1999, p. 131.
 K. Kawalec, Problem prorosyjskości …, p. 320.
 A. Nowak, Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Idee polskiej polityki wschodniej (1733-1921), Kraków 1999, p. 5.
 Leon Wasilewski- one of the most important theoreticians of Piłsudski’s eastern programme, wrote that delineating the border between the countries of the future federation should assume existence of a mixed belt as part of which the future neighbouring state could gain territories inhabited by a certain number of Poles (in: Drogi porozumienia. Wybór pism, ed. B. Stoczewska, Kraków 2001, p. 85)
 J. Sadkiewicz, „Ci, którzy przekonać nie umieją”. Idea porozumienia polsko-niemieckiego w publicystyce Władysłąwa Studnickiego i wileńskiego „Słowa” (do 1939), Kraków 2012, p. 92 and the subsequent ones.
 ibid., p. 86.
 ibid., p. 99
 See more in See e.g. B. Światłowski, Prometejska racja stanu. Źródła i dzieje ruchu prometejskiego w II Rzeczpospolitej, „Poliarichia” 2 (2014), pp. 149-180; P. Libera, Ewolucja w ruchu prometejskim, [in:] Ruch prometejski i walka o przebudowę Europy Wschodniej (1918-1940), ed. M. Kornat, Warsaw 2012, p. 219 and subsequent ones; M. Kornat, O polsko-ukraiński dialog polityczny. Idee programowe „Biuletynu Polsko – Ukraińskiego” (1932-1938). [in:] Giedroyc a Ukraina. Ukraińska perspektywa Jerzego Giedroycia i środowiska paryskiej „Kultury”, ed. M. Semczyszyn, M. Zajączkowski, Warszawa, 2014, p. 33 and the subsequent ones.
 J. Beck, Ostatni raport, Warszawa 1987, p. 70.
 See. M. Kornat, Spór o polską rację stanu w roku 1937, [in:] Geopolityka i zasady. Studia z polskiej myśli politycznej, ed. J. Kloczkowski, Kraków-Warsaw 2010, p. 49.
 See ibid p. 59 and the subsequent ones
 A. Bocheński, Miedzy Niemcami a Rosją, Kraków-Warsaw 2009, p. 123.
 ibid., p. 189
 W. Studnicki, Wobec nadchodzącej II-ej wojny światowej, [in:] the same author, pisma wybrane, vol. 2 Toruń 2001, p. 352