Added: 2017-10-30
Added: 2017-10-30

Józef Piłsudski

Collected Writings.




Interview with correspondent from The Times

(9 February 1920)



On 29 January 1920, the Bolsheviks renewed their proposal of 22 December 1919 to begin peace negotiations with Poland. The question of how Poland would respond to those overtures was of interest for the European public, especially that two currents were competing in Europe at the time: one advocating further war against Bolshevik Russia, and the other one looking for a modus vivendi with it.

Hence Lumby, a correspondent of The Times London daily, asked whether Poland would not yield to Bolshevik propaganda were peace to be declared, and would it be able to withstand Bolshevik military pressure in the event of further war.

Piłsudski’s replies were published in The Times on 14 February 1920 without authorisation as an interview dated “Warsaw, 9 February”.



Piłsudski’s views on the military situation and on the Bolshevik peace proposal were communicated last Friday (6 February) to the Military and Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committees at a secret meeting.[1] Therefore he declined to comment further on the subject.

I asked what measures would be taken to stave off Bolshevik propaganda if peace were to be signed. He answered:

I do not think the Bolsheviks’ propaganda poses a threat to those who know them. Our people have seen Bolshevism up close since the Russian Revolution and are aware of what it means. Our workers know that workers in Russia have no freedom and are not satisfied with the Soviet rule.

So, General, do you think that the socialist programme proclaimed by the Bolsheviks will be less successful in deceiving socialists and the working class in Poland than it is in Great Britain, France and Italy?

No, this is not exactly what I would like to say, but I think that the methods introduced under the socialist system in Russia (namely the policy of terror and the utter destruction of the existing social system) are unthinkable in any civilised country. Please ask British socialists if they would like to ask Lenin and Zinoviev to reshape their government in the Bolshevik image. I think they would say “no” to that. Our socialists would do likewise, but there is a danger that the Bolsheviks might try to come here to rearrange our government without being invited.

In other words, are you not afraid of Bolshevism in peacetime?

The General smiled:

My personal opinion is of almost no importance here, since I am not a man to be easily scared.

So what would be the Bolsheviks’ chances in a war? Are you not more afraid of their army, General?

No, these are terrible soldiers after all! The Polish soldier is much better. We have always beaten them. Why should I be afraid of them?

Still, the argument of their great power cannot be ignored. Let us suppose that Trotsky can concentrate 200,000 soldiers in Vitebsk, and you, General, can only muster 100,000, what then?

The General replied resolutely:

If the Bolsheviks were to succeed, this would be a very limited victory indeed and the matter would be dealt with very quickly. In my opinion, it is impossible for Poland to lose this war. Poland cannot lose the war.

General, do you think that Bolsheviks intend to launch an offensive against the Polish front?

Definitely. They are amassing more forces each day and preparing to attack.

This is difficult to reconcile with the tone of their peace note, which sounds very conciliatory. General, do you think that their proposal was sincere?

Is it even possible to be sincere in politics? They must have an alternative ready in case their proposal is rejected. And they are right to sue for peace. Their strength is running out and their people want peace. People there believe, as we do, that it is the war that is causing high prices and food shortages. When they get peace, they will find that prices continue to rise, since Russia will need many things from abroad and will have to find money to purchase them. However, the people’s yearning for peace in an issue that the Bolshevik leaders will have to contend with. I am telling you that the present moment is a critical one for the Soviet government.

I asked the General whether he thought that the Russian revolution had already reached its final stage and produced the form of government that best suited the Russian people.

From the psychological point of view, people will say that the revolution has lost its momentum and that its initiators are now looking for something else to replace it.

Do you think that imperialism will deliver that something else and that the Russian revolution will give rise to a Napoleon Bonaparte?

Not in the least. The conditions that once favoured Napoleon are no longer here. Revolutionary France defeated its neighbours everywhere, and this fuelled the nation’s enthusiasm for war. Napoleon used that national enthusiasm to further his own goals. Nothing like that is present in Russia today. The Russian revolutionaries’ only victories were won against their compatriots. Everyone else beat them soundly. Victories in a civil war always leave a scar in the victorious army’s heart; they never stir enthusiasm.

Red Armies are discouraged by the war and weary of it, and they have no such material as Napoleon’s grenadiers at their disposal. The Bolsheviks are loudly claiming that their system is invincible, but these words do not have a basis in facts. All these proclamations are an empty shell with a hard surface, but nothing inside.


Interview with correspondent from Echo de Paris.

(first half of February 1920)



The interview cited below was given at the same time as the previous one, so it concerns similar matters. Because hostile forces wished to contain Poland within its ethnographic borders in the name of fighting “imperialism”, Piłsudski made statements against policies that aimed at depriving peoples of their national identity.

The interview was published in the Echo de Paris daily of 12 February 1920 and dated: “Warsaw, February”; it was signed by Charles Bonnefon. The interview was not authorised.



– You have arrived at a moment that is particularly important and decisive for Poland. There are some questions that I, as Chief of State, will not be able to answer at this time; I cannot, for example, tell you what position Poland will take if the Entente decides to make peace with the Bolsheviks or to continue the war against them.

I would only like to say that the matter is most urgent and that Poland needs this decision immediately, no matter what it will be. Our country’s misfortunes are caused by precisely this absence of a clear decision from the Coalition. We are left to our own devices with the eastern issue because Europe is at a loss what to do. France or England may wait, ponder the matter and watch the course of events; maybe they see some benefit in that. However, we Poles are Russia’s direct neighbours. The fate of our efforts depends on our decision. We must decide either way by saying “yes” or “no”, calling for peace or for war. We cannot wait any longer.

Would a prolonged war spell ruin for Poland?

We are feeling the weight of the last five years, which wrought so much destruction, much more than that of the war. The war we are waging right now is not really unbearable. We did not need to mobilise as many people as a serious campaign would require. Neither the industry nor agriculture are suffering from workforce shortages. We have the greatest confidence in our troops. Last winter, our soldiers proved their spiritual strength. Without equipment and ammunition, or with hardly any ammunition, they fought admirably for days on end.

We are waging war against military organisations of very low standing compared to us. Equipment does not play an essential role in our campaign and so far, we have been able to make decisive manoeuvres each time. What we need the most is railway rolling stock in order to concentrate quickly or to shift troops.

All my experience with the Bolsheviks is giving me faith for the future. These soldiers have bad commanders, are poorly led and lack fortitude. Their small advance guards are valiant, but the main forces that follow them barely deserve to be called an army.

I have thoroughly studied the manner in which the Bolsheviks fight. Here is the result of my experience so far: when defending, the Bolsheviks hold out until the evening. As soon as the night falls, they run away. When attacking, they can only fight for a few hours, then they run out of stamina and are good for nothing.

In terms of manoeuvring, the Bolshevik army has very poor skills.

I really do not consider it very dangerous, although German officers are providing training and developing plans for the Bolshevik staff.

And Kolchak?[2] – I objected.

         I was met with a burst of sincere laughter.

– Kolchak was even worse. His army, which consisted of officers without soldiers or mercenaries without any patriotism, was badly organised as well. Advance guards fought skilfully, but the main forces were worth even less than those of the Bolsheviks.

Currently, I am not afraid of Germans either – they will become a terrible danger to us only later. I was very much concerned about the German concentration in Courland. I knew that they were well-armed, well-organised and lacked nothing. However, their troops lacked enthusiasm and we saw how the Latvians, badly equipped, without ammunition, almost without artillery, with only two laughable batteries, routed those great warriors.[3] This is a fact that cannot be explained unless we account for the Germans’ very low spirits. They are depressed, crushed by the weight of their defeat. Despite the fact that Ludendorff, Hoffman[4] and others dream of the monarchy’s return after some campaign in Russia, I am convinced that the Germans will not fight the Bolsheviks. They are completely exhausted. The German people are buckling under this burden.

General, you are returning from Vilnius. Will you tell me about your impressions from the trip?

The Chief of State’s face becomes radiant, he smiles.

Well, I’m a child of this country! Everyone knows me and loves me. I am a local celebrity (laughing). They welcome me in Vilnius like a citizen of that city who shares all its aspirations.

Are there as many Jews in Vilnius as they say?

Their numbers have decreased considerably. Before the war, Vilnius had 200,000 inhabitants. Since that time, all suburbs have been incorporated into the city, but it still numbers only 120,000 souls. Many Jews have left.

General, what is your policy towards Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine?

I am a realist who does not hold any prejudices and does not formulate any theories. I only think that we need to carefully determine the means at our disposal in advance and adjust them to the goal that we are pursuing.

The will of the countries we occupy is the only determining factor for me. Not for all the world would I want Poland to rule over vast tracts of land inhabited by hostile populations. History has demonstrated that in the long run, these scattered concentrations of people are dangerous. Just look at Austria, look at Russia. A country that is now only being revived like Poland should not be burdened with such costly problems.

We are bringing freedom to these unhappy countries on our bayonets, without any reservations. I know that many Poles do not share my opinion. They attribute the unwillingness of some of our neighbours to become Poles to “deficits of the mind and of the heart”. Some of our patriots claim that deep inside these people are Poles, although they are not conscious of that. This was the language spoken by Russians and Germans as well. They also attributed the Poles’ repulsion towards Russia or Germany to deficits of our minds and of our hearts.

Bringing freedom to our neighbours will be the glory of my life – as a statesman and as a soldier. I know the historical ties that bind us to them and I know that these ties often became closer after the partitions of Poland. By liberating these oppressed peoples, I want to obliterate the last traces of the partitions.

But to bind them to Poland by force – never! This would be committing new violations in response to the violations committed in the past.

Interview with correspondent from Le Matin

(15 February 1920)



Piłsudski was always of the opinion that the most important tasks for Polish foreign policy lay in the east of Europe. Hence the desire, expressed in the interview cited below, to influence the Western powers so that they would recognise Poland as an important actor in the determination of political relationships in Eastern Europe.

The interview was published in the Paris Le Matin daily on 20 February 1920 and dated: “Warsaw, 15 February”; it was signed by Henryk Korab-Kucharski.



– The time has come to make peace with Russia. This moment has come not only for us, but also for all the Entente states.

To date, no one has dared to take on this enormous problem, but everyone has tried to skirt it instead, using half measures. To a certain extent, Kolchak,[5] Denikin[6] and others provided an ostrich’s wing under which the world’s diplomacy hid its head for months on end. However, those were obsolete and therefore reactionary measures. There is no way to bring the old Russia back to life, at all costs, with the help of former Russians. We need to look for new formulas … We need sufficient courage to understand that a huge change has occurred in the east of Europe.

Now is the time to show that courage. We need to start working in earnest. Poland offers to help the Coalition in this difficult task. We are not doing this out of ambition or because we want to play some role, but simply because we believe that Poland is the country most directly interested in the outcome and thus should take initiative.

So we are now working on a plan to achieve a legitimate solution in the east of Europe. This plan will soon be put forward to the Entente powers. It may not be suitable in all details and some of its clauses may lead to a discussion, but in any case, our draft will provide a basis and a starting point for regularising this matter finally.

– General, but do not you think that agreement with the Bolsheviks could pose a grave danger to Europe?

I am well aware of the dangers. These have emerged, for example, because the Bolsheviks act not just as Bolsheviks. There are other influences in the Moscow government, which are clearly hostile to Poland and the Entente powers; influences that have nothing to do with the social revolution.[7] Still, I am deeply convinced that it is better to expose ourselves to dangers which we can fight than to maintain indefinitely a state of affairs that will clearly have a disastrous effect.

General, do you expect that after peace is concluded, Bolshevik propaganda will resume?

Probably, but I am not afraid of it. After peace is made, France and England will not be more exposed to Bolshevik propaganda than it is the case now. It may even be the case that in Paris and London, Bolshevism will largely lose its halo. When it comes to Poland, which is Russia’s closest neighbour, I am not afraid of anything at all. The country is completely resistant to Bolshevik influence. Yesterday, the Russian Bolsheviks tried to organise a general strike in Warsaw, and the attempt failed miserably. On the front, the proclamations sent to our soldiers by those from the other side are answered with gunfire.

Getting up, the General finishes:

– Fear of Bolshevism should not become a pretext for doing nothing.


Interview with correspondent from Le Petit Parisien

(28 February 1920)



The Bolsheviks submitted peace proposals to Poland; at the same time, their military forces, released after so-called white armies had been defeated on internal fronts, were moved to the Polish front. This obviously created the impression that they were putting pressure on Poland, and the peaceful atmosphere ostensibly created by their proposals led to suspicions that the Bolsheviks wanted to undermine Poland’s combat readiness and gain the time needed to shift their forces to our front.

Piłsudski wanted to draw attention to these facts in the following interview, which was published in Le Petit Parisien on 6 March 1920, dated “Warsaw, 5 March” and signed by Robert Vaucher who states at the beginning of the article that he visited Piłsudski on 28 February 1920.



– A personal statement about peace is a very delicate issue to me. The matter is too urgent and huge efforts are now being made to resolve it. Any statements that I could make to you at this time could endanger the success of our government’s endeavours or adversely affect them. Until these decisions are announced, I must maintain my silence owing to the serious character of the matters at issue. Nevertheless, I can tell you that Poland wants peace because it has always had peaceful intentions. The proof is that we do not refuse to discuss the peace proposed to us. In principle, Poland does not want to reject negotiations. Still, and I will repeat this once more, we will never be able to, or want to, negotiate under any threat. Initially, I thought that the Bolsheviks could be negotiating with us peacefully and without ulterior motives. I also wanted Poland to start peace negotiations without any such motives, playing open cards. I did not want to exploit our advantageous situation and base our arguments on our military strength. I did not want a peace that would be imposed by our cannons and bayonets. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik behaviour does not give the impression that we are discussing peace for the sake of peace; quite the opposite, this is a peace that the Bolsheviks want to achieve with violent threats, like they did with the Estonians.[8] When I have a knife put to my throat, I feel bad. I am not a man who can be talked to in this way. I can be firm and get angry too if someone wants to impose his will on me by threatening me. I am sure that all Poland will agree with me. We are ready to negotiate, but we strongly reject all threats. We will never make peace when threatened in this way. The choice is between a meaningful peace that is voluntarily accepted and a war.

I know that the Bolsheviks are concentrating considerable forces on our front. They are mistaken if they think that they can intimidate us and put an ultimatum to us. Our troops are ready and I have complete confidence in them. I know that if our army is threatened, it can pose a threat itself.

And I am not afraid of the famous Bolshevik propaganda, which is used as a bogeyman by some. It does not affect Poland. At most, it may stir up local unrest here or there, but it is unable to provoke a general revolutionary movement for one simple reason – we are too close to Russia. It is precisely us – as neighbours of the Soviet Republic – that are fully aware of the results of the communist experiment. In Poland even those that are – let us call them the most radical so as not to give offence – are terrified of the abyss that Bolshevism has thrown Russia into. They are aware of this  and therefore do not want to follow Russia’s example. Bolshevik propaganda may in some cases exploit dissatisfaction with internal problems, which are difficult to avoid in the present economic circumstances, but is unable to impose the communist system on us. European nations more remote from the hearth of Bolshevism might still believe in the loveliness of the system introduced by Lenin. But we, who judge this system at close quarters, already have a formed opinion about it. We are terrified by the horrible situation created in Russia by Bolshevism.

We know well that Russia will never be able to supply Europe with the grain which is reportedly expected from it. When you have grain, you do not die of hunger. Meanwhile, people are literally starving in most Soviet provinces. The population is shrinking at an unbelievable rate. Official statistical figures that I have just received show that in the past year alone, the population of certain provinces has decreased by 13%. The Soviets state that in the entire Republic, there are 4,000,000 workers and 10,000,000 families that consist of female workers and children, i.e. childless families or those with just one or two children. Mortality among children is such that an entire generation is disappearing, having falling victim to the socialist experiments of Lenin and Trotsky. If Russia wants to continue these disastrous experiments, let her, but Poland will never agree to voluntarily go to its death by attempting to taste communism as well. Now, when we are free, we are too attached to life to risk its loss in exchange for empty delusions.

General, I would like to ask you what you think of the Coalition’s policy towards Russia, if there is such a policy at all, because as seen from Warsaw, this appears very doubtful.

The General frowned and declined to speak. As he told me, he did not want to say something bitter.

– The worst thing in politics is zigzagging.

Poland cannot adapt to this way of doing things – it is impossible. Given its geographic position, it must anticipate events and cannot constantly change the course of its policy.

The arrival of plenipotentiaries of the Baltic states in Warsaw[9] was too important an event not to ask General Piłsudski of his opinion.

– We do not want to start negotiations with Russia without knowing the opinions or views of all those interested in the Russian question. Lithuania does not participate in the conference, since it has no border with Russia and issues of peace or war have no major significance for it. The conference in Warsaw is the first step towards a rapprochement between the eastern states. Poland is regaining its historical role.

When I got up to say goodbye, the Chief of State told me the following, emphasising every word:

– I stress once again that we will never agree to opening peace negotiations while threatened by the Red Army. I have confidence in my troops and I am not afraid of any assault.

Interview with correspondent from Daily Express

(15 June 1920)



The following unauthorised interview revolves around the issue of peace negotiations with Russia, which were no longer conducted at the time when the interview was published.

The correspondent apparently completely misinterpreted Piłsudski’s statements. Since we are unable to determine what Piłsudski could actually have said at the time, and what statements are the result of inaccurate editing, we do not offer any comments. The interview was published in the English Daily Express of 17 June 1920 and was dated 15 June.




When will peace be concluded with Russia and under what conditions will Poland negotiate with the Bolsheviks?

At present, there is a ministerial crisis in Poland – and there is the question of peace and its terms. I cannot divulge anything now that could harm negotiations.

But the state is in fact you, Marshal…

I am not Louis XIV, but I can say that Poland is still willing to start negotiations with Russia, just as it was the case two months ago. In principle, the conditions have not changed. We still want a treaty.

Then he added, showing some agitation for the first time during our interview:

– But where are our guarantees? Therein lies the hitch.

The last thing that Poland needs right now is a suspicion that the Soviets could fail to observe the terms of this peace after it has been concluded. The true Russia does not exist politically. How could it offer a guarantee of permanent peace to Europe?

If peace were concluded, what would you imagine its enforcement would look like, general?

It could become binding if Russia’s internal relations changed and if Russia were to undergo a revolution. Then there would be grounds for hope that both Poland and Russia could return to their hearths and lick their wounds. Only then would we no longer be afraid of the threat from the East, and we would be able to disband our numerous armies that are now ready for battle.

I have noticed that there are imperialist tendencies in some circles in Poland. Marshal Piłsudski’s reply was laconic:

– This goes against our nature, and those who make such claims do not know Poland.

Finally, I asked about his opinion on Krasin’s negotiations in London. His reply was equally brief and firm:

– Those who conduct these negotiations do not know Russia.

Interview in Le Petit Parisien

(16 March 1919)



The interview cited below was conducted with Piłsudski by Claude Anet, representative of the Le Petit Parisien daily on 16 March 1919. The interview appeared in the 23 March 1919 edition.

The interview discusses Piłsudski’s attitude towards the Central Powers during World War I and includes Piłsudski’s predictions concerning Russian policy.

The interview was not authorised.


General, what was your intention when you armed the Legions against Russia?

I had a deep hatred for Russia, since it oppressed my country in a horrible way, which is hard even to imagine in France. My main goal was to create national Polish military forces. This was impossible in the lands that were ruled by Russia after the partitions. Still, I had no choice. I formed my units in Galicia. Then I asked myself the question: who would be the first to be defeated in the event of a war, Austria or Russia? I knew the organic weakness of the Russian state, so I chose to go against Russia.

I have a question to ask here and you, General, are so sincere in what you are saying that I will allow myself to ask it.

General, you fought against the Entente in the war. Did you not consider that in this way, you could have weakened the coalition and that as far as it was possible, you wanted to see it defeated?

We were in no way able to believe Russia’s promises of autonomy. Russia makes promises when she is forced to do so, and she reneges on them when she is strong enough to do so. In 1815, Alexander I promised Poland a constitution and delivered.[10] But what did he do with us before the end of his reign and what did his successors do to us? You know all that. During the present war, the most important thing was to form a Polish army that would be able to defend Poland if necessary.

But if we had been beaten, what would Poland’s fate have been?

Had the Entente been defeated, Poland would have gained more freedom under Germans and Austrians than it enjoyed under Russian rule. This would already have been a benefit. But a treaty was made with the German and Austrian governments that in no case could the Legions be used on the western front.

General, why did the Germans arrest you?

They felt that I was fighting for Poland rather than for them. I was too independent. Just like my officers, I resisted all their attempts to recruit soldiers in Poland in order to sustain their war against the Coalition. So they arrested me in 1917 and put me in the Magdeburg fortress.

The interviewer mentions that Piłsudski was imprisoned until the outbreak of the revolution and that he was freed by Graf von Kessler, a well-known figure in Parisian artistic circles before the war.

Why did Mr. von Kessler free you, General?

I knew him personally and dealt with him during the war when I commanded the Legions.[11] He knew that the revolution would free me anyway. He wanted to take credit for freeing me; he also undoubtedly imagined that he would harm my image in the eyes of the Coalition in this way and that two years of German prison would be forgotten.

General, do you still belong to a socialist party?

I do not belong to any party.

Did you have any trouble with the Polish National Committee in Paris?[12]

These difficulties are now being removed.[13] The Parisian Committee had no detailed information on Polish affairs and could not see the exact picture from a distance. Its members have not been in Poland for a long time.

General, what is the political situation now in your opinion?

In my opinion, the upheaval in Russia will last long, very long, even if the Bolsheviks are overthrown. You cannot predict the future. Depending on what consecutive governments it is led by, Russia will be an ally of either Germany or Poland. Thus we will sometimes be friends and sometimes enemies of Russia. For now, I am convinced that Soviet Russia will try to attack Poland. Irrespective of its government, Russia is fiercely imperialist. This is an essential trait of her political character. Once we had tsarist imperialism; today we see its red version, i.e. Soviet imperialism. Poland is a barrier against Slavic imperialism, whether tsarist or Bolshevik. The Bolsheviks are still strong because they have a very large ruling class; these people have made their careers and fortunes under Bolshevism and know that the success of their doctrines is a matter of life or death for them. If they are defeated, they will be hanged so they will defend themselves vigorously. Their attack on Poland is primarily dependent on the outcome of the Ukrainian issue. The Soviet policy is influenced by material considerations, and first of all by hunger. They need food from Ukraine, which is rich. If the Ukrainian case is settled in their favour, they will advance on Poland, but in order to reach it, they will have to cross lands that are completely destroyed and desert-like – these lands cannot provide them with anything. Thus they have to take everything from Ukraine. Finally, given the geographical conditions, they will be forced to move along the few railway lines that exist. They have no horses and thus cannot stray far from railway tracks.

And their internal propaganda?

At this moment I believe that it has no chance of being successful. We have hardly any workers and if the land reform is implemented, we will have enormous numbers of small farmers.


[1] Piłsudski was not present at the secret meeting of the joint Military and Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committees held on 6 February 1920. Explanations on behalf of the Government were provided by Stanisław Patek as Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski as Deputy Minister of Military Affairs and Colonel Stanisław Haller as Chief of Staff.

[2] Alexander Kolchak was a Russian admiral and commander of the counter-revolutionary army in Siberia. At the beginning of 1920, his army was already falling apart and on 20 February 1920 he was executed by a Bolshevik firing squad in Irkutsk.

[3] In November 1919, the Latvian army defeated German troops led by Pavel Bermondt and forced them to withdraw from the Latvian territory.

[4] General Max Hoffmann, Chief of Staff of the German Eastern Front.

[5] Cf. page 146.

[6] Russian General Anton Denikin, Chief Commander of the southern counter-revolutionary army.

[7] German inspirations are meant here.

[8] Estonia was the first of the Baltic states to make peace with Soviet Russia on 2 February 1920.

[9] At that time, the Polish government invited representatives of Russia’s neighbours for a conference in Warsaw.

[10] Alexander I granted a constitution to the Kingdom of Poland on 27 November 1815.

[11] Piłsudski first met Graf Harry Kessler, who was German Ambassador to Poland from 19 November 1918 until 15 December 1918, in late autumn near Koszyszcze. Kessler, who had the rank of cavalry captain, arrived as General Linsingen’s liaison officer.

[12] See page 45 (letter to Roman Dmowski of 21 December 1918).

[13] Piłsudski was probably referring to the fact that the Polish National Committee was joined (from the end of January until the middle of March 1919) by people from the Piłsudski camp (Dłuski, Sokolnicki, Sujkowski, Patek, Thugutt, Medard Downarowicz, Leon Wasilewski).

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